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LAW SUMMARY  
Cloaking a Challenge to Missouri’s Marriage 
Amendment with a Challenge for Survivor 
Benefits  
BENJAMIN S. HARNER* 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
On Christmas day of 2009, the Missouri State Highway Patrol (MSHP) 
tragically lost trooper Dennis Engelhard.  Engelhard was attending to a minor 
accident on Interstate 44 near Eureka, Missouri, when a vehicle lost control 
and struck and killed him.1  In the days immediately following his death, lit-
tle, if any, thought would be given to the enormous implications that this loss 
would have on Missouri state law, and even less thought would be given to 
the possibility that Engelhard’s death might become the backdrop for another 
layer of argument surrounding the ongoing same-sex marriage debate 
throughout the country.  Appropriately, the immediate focus following Eng-
elhard’s death was on the tragedy that surrounds losing one who so bravely 
serves the public.  His obituary praised him for his service and noted that 
Governor Jay Nixon ordered flags at all state buildings be flown at half-staff 
in Engelhard’s honor.2   
Following the death of an officer of the law, concern often shifts to the 
officer’s surviving family and loved ones with the hope that they will be pro-
vided for following their tragic loss.  However, this situation was different.  
There was more to this story than Engelhard’s obituary, which stated that his 
parents and brother survived him and that he was single with no children.3  
Nowhere in his obituary did it mention that Engelhard was gay or that he had 
  
 * B.A., University of Evansville, 2008; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri 
School of Law, 2013; Lead Articles Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2012-2013.  I am 
grateful to Professor Josh Hawley for his support and guidance throughout the draft-
ing and editing process.  I am also very thankful for the input and assistance provided 
by the Missouri Law Review editing team.  Finally, but most importantly, I thank my 
parents, Mike and Carin, for their love and support.   
 1. Jake Wagman, Sliding Car Kills Trooper on I-44: Officer was on Scene of an 
Accident, One of Dozens Caused by Slick Roadways, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 
26, 2009, at A1.  
 2. Cpl. Dennis E. Engelhard: Funeral Services Are Announced for Fallen State 
Trooper, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 29, 2009, at A17.  
 3. Id.  Englehard was laid to rest on December 30, 2009, in his hometown of 
Brookfield, Missouri.  Honoring a Fallen Trooper, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 
31, 2009, at A22.  
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been in a committed same-sex relationship with Kelly Glossip for fifteen 
years.4  Despite the couple’s relationship, it soon became clear that under 
Missouri law, Glossip was ineligible to receive the same benefits that the 
spouse of a married, heterosexual officer receives following the loss of his or 
her loved one.   
On August 5, 2010, Glossip formally sought survivor benefits by filing a 
Survivor Application with the Missouri Department of Transportation and 
Highway Patrol Employees’ Retirement System (MPERS).5  Shortly thereaf-
ter, MPERS sent a letter to Glossip’s attorney denying Glossip’s claim for 
survivor benefits under Missouri Revised Statutes section 104.140.6  This 
section provides that if an employee’s death “was a natural and proximate 
result of a personal injury or disease arising out of and in the course of the 
member’s actual performance of duty as an employee, then the minimum 
benefit to such member’s surviving spouse . . . shall be fifty percent of the 
member’s final average compensation.”7  The denial letter cited Missouri 
Revised Statutes section 104.012, which provides that for purposes of the 
retirement systems administered under Chapter 104, “spouse” refers only to 
an individual in a marriage between a man and a woman.8  MPERS also ref-
erenced Missouri Revised Statutes section 451.022, Missouri’s general statute 
providing that same-sex marriage is not recognized for any purpose.9  On 
October 14, 2010, Glossip appealed the MPERS Executive Director’s de-
nial.10  The MPERS Board of Trustees met a month later and upheld the de-
nial.11   
  
 4. Glossip Aff. ¶ 2, July 23, 2010, available at 
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Glossip_Benefits_Application.pdf.  
 5. Glossip Survivor Application to MODOT & Patrol Employees’ Retirement 
System (MPERS) [hereinafter Survivor Application], available at 
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Glossip_Benefits_Application.pdf.  The Survivor 
Application is dated July 23, 2010, but MPERS did not receive the Survivor Applica-
tion until August 5, 2010.  Id.  
 6. Letter from Susie Dahl, Exec. Dir., Mo. Patrol Emps. Ret. Sys., to Roger K. 
Heidenreich, Attorney for Kelly D. Glossip (Aug. 17, 2010) [hereinafter Denial Let-
ter], available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Glossip_Benefits_Denial.pdf.  
 7. MO. REV. STAT. § 104.140.3 (Supp. 2011).  
 8. Denial Letter, supra note 6.  Specifically, Missouri Revised Statutes section 
104.012 provides: “For the purposes of public retirement systems administered pursu-
ant to this chapter, any reference to the term ‘spouse’ only recognizes marriage be-
tween a man and a woman.”  MO. REV. STAT. § 104.012.  
 9. Denial Letter, supra note 6.  Missouri Revised Statutes section 451.022.4 
provides in pertinent part: “A marriage between persons of the same sex will not be 
recognized for any purpose in this state even when valid where contracted.”  MO. 
REV. STAT. § 451.002.4. 
 10. Request for Review, In re: Survivor Application – Dennis Engelhard, De-
ceased, (Appeal No. 2010-1), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Glossip 
_Trustees_Appeal.pdf.  Glossip’s appeal laid the groundwork for his eventual Petition 
and later documents filed in his lawsuit, discussed infra Part III.  Id.  His arguments in 
 
2
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 77, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol77/iss4/7
File: HarnerPaginated.docx Created on: 6/24/13 10:54 PM Last Printed: 10/23/13 8:40 PM 
2012] CLOAKING MISSOURI’S MARRIAGE AMENDMENT 1203 
 
Glossip then brought an action against MPERS in the Circuit Court of 
Cole County.12  The arguments advanced by both Glossip and MPERS have 
been consistent throughout the litigation.13  Since the onset of this lawsuit, 
  
his appeal attack Missouri Revised Statutes section 104.140.3 as a statute in violation 
of the Missouri Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection and substantive due proc-
ess, as well as a violation of Missouri’s prohibition of “special law[s].”  Id. ¶¶ 17, 26.  
 11. Certificate Authenticating Records Kept by the System (Nov. 26, 2010) (at-
taching MPERS Board of Trustees meeting minutes from Nov. 18, 2010), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Glossip_Appeal_Denial.pdf. 
 12. Petition for Injunctive Relief and Declaratory Relief, Glossip v. Mo. Dep’t of 
Transp. & Highway Patrol Emps. Ret. Sys., No. 10-CC00434 (Cole Cnty. Cir. Ct. 
dismissed Apr. 30, 2012), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/glossipB.pdf.  
Glossip filed his lawsuit with the help of the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU).  Id.  Glossip’s Amended Petition, filed on April 4, 2011, sought, inter alia:  
(1) A declaration that [MPERS’s] failure to 
provide same-sex, surviving, domestic partners 
of gay, lesbian, and bisexual MSHP employees 
the opportunity to obtain survivor benefits that 
are available to different-sex couples through 
the legal status of marriage violat[ed] . . . 
Glossip’s right to equal protection under . . . 
the Missouri Constitution. 
(2) A declaration that [MPERS’s] exclusion of 
same-sex, surviving, domestic partners of de-
ceased gay, lesbian, and bisexual MSHP em-
ployees from the survivor benefits that are 
available to different-sex couples who marry 
violates . . . Glossip’s right to due process un-
der . . . the Missouri Constitution.  
(3) A declaration that [Missouri Revised Stat-
utes sections] 104.012 and 104.140.3 are a 
special law and, therefore, violate . . . the Mis-
souri Constitution. 
(4) An order enjoining [MPERS] from con-
tinuing to deny . . . Glossip access to survivor 
benefits. 
Amended Petition for Injunctive Relief and Declaratory Relief at 16-17, Glossip, No. 
10-CC00434 [hereinafter Amended Petition], available at http://www.aclu.org/files 
/assets/Unopposed_Motion_and_Amd_Petition.pdf.   
 13. On May 26, 2011, MPERS filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended 
Petition.  Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Glossip, No. 10AC-CC00434, available at 
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/glossip_mtd_amended_petition.pdf;  Memorandum in 
Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Petition, Glossip, No. 
10AC-CC00434 [hereinafter Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended 
Petition], available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/glossip_mtd_amended_ peti-
tion.pdf.  In July, Glossip responded to the Motion to Dismiss and countered with his 
own Motion for Summary Judgment, which was corrected and re-filed on November 
30, 2011.  Plaintiff Kelly Glossip’s Corrected Memorandum in Opposition to Defen-
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Glossip has contended that he is not challenging Missouri’s Marriage 
Amendment that bans gay marriage.14  Instead, he is “simply seek[ing] the 
same survivor benefit that [Missouri] has chosen to offer only different-sex, 
surviving partners of MSHP employees.”15  Glossip focused his arguments on 
the idea that although Missouri only recognizes marriage between a man and 
a woman, the constitutional protections shared by all Missourians – equal 
protection,16 due process,17 and governance by general, rather than special, 
laws18– applied to him and had been violated.19 
This Law Summary focuses on Glossip’s ongoing challenge to receive 
survivor benefits.  The case not only implicates the Missouri Constitution’s 
equal protection and due process clauses, but it is also controversial because 
it involves the same-sex marriage issues that have stirred national debate for 
quite some time.  This Law Summary will discuss each of these issues.  Spe-
cifically, Part II provides the legal background for Missouri’s equal protec-
tion and substantive due process clauses and provides case law pertaining to 
situations similar to Glossip’s that have arisen in other states.  Part III pro-
vides a more in-depth background of Glossip’s lawsuit, focusing on the ar-
guments advanced by both Glossip and MPERS.  Part IV provides discussion 
and analysis of the arguments and the case in general.  Part V concludes that 
Missouri courts should uphold the denial of benefits and rule in favor of 
MPERS. 
  
dant’s Motion to Dismiss and In Support of His Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Glossip, No. 10AC-CC00434 [hereinafter Corrected Memorandum].  Additionally, 
MPERS filed a reply in support of its Motion to Dismiss.  Reply in Support of Defen-
dant’s Motion to Dismiss, Glossip, No. 10AC-CC00434, available at 
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/glossip_-_reply_in_support_of_defendants_motion 
_to_dismiss.pdf.  MPERS responded to Glossip’s summary judgment motion on Feb-
ruary 1, 2012 and Glossip replied on February 15, 2012.  Defendant’s Response in 
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Glossip, No. 10AC-
CC00434 (Feb. 1, 2012), [hereinafter Defendant’s Response in Opposition], available 
at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/glossip_-_defs_response_in_opp_to_plfs_mot_for 
_summ_judg.pdf; Plaintiff Kelly Glossip’s Reply in Support of his Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment, Glossip, No. 10AC-CC00434) [hereinafter Plaintiff’s Reply in Sup-
port], available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/plfs_reply_in_support_of_his 
_motion_for_summary_judgment.pdf. 
 14. Amended Petition, supra note 12, ¶ 2.  
 15. Id.  
 16. See MO. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
 17. See MO. CONST. art I, § 10. 
 18. See MO. CONST. art. III, § 40.  The focus of this Law Summary will be on 
Glossip’s equal protection and due process claims.  Glossip’s special law claim will 
not be discussed. 
 19. Amended Petition, supra note 12, ¶ 3.  
4
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II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This Part of the Law Summary will provide the legal background 
needed to fully understand the arguments made by Glossip and MPERS.  
First, it details the Missouri Constitution’s equal protection and substantive 
due process clauses.  Next, it provides a brief summary and history of legal 
arguments used when subjecting a challenged statute to heightened scrutiny.  
It then looks at the approach used in reviewing laws that have been enacted 
on the basis of animosity toward a group of individuals.  Finally, this Part will 
provide a look at case law from states that have been presented with chal-
lenges to statutes similar to Missouri Revised Statutes section 104.140.   
A.  Missouri’s Equal Protection Clause 
The Missouri Constitution provides that “all persons are created equal 
and are entitled to equal rights and opportunity under the law[.]”20  Missouri’s 
equal protection clause is “coextensive” with the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution.21  That is, the Missouri Constitution and the 
Fourteenth Amendment provide individuals with the same protections.22  
Specifically, Missouri has long recognized that its clause provides “equal 
security or burden under the laws to every one similarly situated; and that no 
person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of the laws 
which is enjoyed by other persons or classes of persons in the same place and 
under like circumstances.”23  The Supreme Court of Missouri engages in a 
two-part analysis in deciding whether a statute violates the equal protection 
clause: 
The first step is to determine whether the classification operates to 
the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges upon a funda-
mental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution.  
If so, the classification is subject to strict scrutiny and this [c]ourt 
must determine whether it is necessary to accomplish a compelling 
  
 20. MO. CONST. art. I, § 2.  
 21. Bernat v. State, 194 S.W.3d 863, 867 (Mo. 2006) (en banc).  The Fourteenth 
Amendment’s equal protection clause provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV, § 1.  
 22. In re Care & Treatment of Coffman, 225 S.W.3d 439, 445 (Mo. 2007) (en 
banc) (citing Bernat, 194 S.W.3d 863). 
 23. Bernat, 194 S.W.3d at 867 (quoting Ex parte Wilson, 48 S.W.2d 919, 921 
(Mo. 1932)). 
5
Harner: Harner: Cloaking a Challenge
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
File: HarnerPaginated.docx Created on:  6/24/13 10:54 PM Last Printed: 10/23/13 8:40 PM 
1206 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77  
 
state interest.  If not, review is limited to determining whether the 
classification is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.24 
Concerning the initial step, the existence of a suspect classification is 
apparent “where a group of persons is legally categorized and the resulting 
class is ‘saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of pur-
poseful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political power-
lessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian politi-
cal process.’”25  Examples of such suspect classifications include those 
“based upon race, national origin or illegitimacy[.]”26  Alternatively, if a 
plaintiff claims an equal protection violation for the denial of a fundamental 
right, he or she must identify a right that is either “explicitly or implicitly 
guaranteed by the Constitution,”27 such as the right to free speech, to vote, to 
travel interstate, or to some other basic liberty.28 
Importantly, Missouri has found that most classifications do not disad-
vantage a suspect class or impinge on a fundamental right.29  Such classifica-
tions are analyzed under the rational basis standard and withstand a constitu-
tional attack “if any state of facts can be reasonably conceived that would 
justify [the law].”30  Statutes that only affect economic interests, for example, 
do not implicate fundamental rights and thus receive rational basis scrutiny.31  
For such statutes, there is “a presumption of rationality that can only be over-
  
 24. In re Care & Treatment of Norton, 123 S.W.3d 170, 173 (Mo. 2003) (en 
banc) (quoting Etling v. Westport Heating & Cooling Servs., Inc., 92 S.W.3d 771, 
774 (Mo. 2003) (en banc)).  
 25. Missourians for Tax Justice Educ. Project v. Holden, 959 S.W.2d 100, 103 
(Mo. 1997) (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 
(1973)).  
 26. Mahoney v. Doerhoff Surgical Servs., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 503, 512 (Mo. 1991) 
(en banc).  See generally Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (ex-
plaining the reason that race, national origin, or illegitimacy are examples of suspect 
classifications).  
 27. Mahoney, 807 S.W.2d at 512 (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33-34). 
 28. Id.  
 29. See, e.g., Alderson v. State, 273 S.W.3d 533 (Mo. 2009) (en banc) (holding 
classifications did not violate the equal protection clause because they were rationally 
related to legitimate state interests). 
 30. Id. at 537 (quoting Missourians for Tax Justice Educ. Project, 959 S.W.2d at 
103). 
 31. See id. at 537-38; see also In re Marriage of Kohring, 999 S.W.2d 228, 232 
(Mo. 1999) (en banc) (“Because father’s asserted ‘right’ involves only his economic, 
rather than his associational interests with his daughter, [the statute] is not subject to 
strict judicial scrutiny.”); City of St. Joseph v. Preferred Family Healthcare, Inc., 859 
S.W.2d 723, 728 (Mo. App. W.D. 1993) (“Zoning ordinances designating residential 
districts and defining a family unit deal with economic and social legislation, not with 
a fundamental interest or a suspect classification”). 
6
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come by a clear showing of arbitrariness and irrationality.”32  The individual 
attacking the classification has the burden of demonstrating that it is irrational 
and purely arbitrary.33  Along these lines, there is no fundamental right to 
collect survivorship benefits or benefit from a retirement system by virtue of 
one’s relationship with a retirement system member.34  Moreover, when ap-
plying rational basis review, Missouri courts do not question the social or 
economic policies underlying a statute.35  
B.  Missouri’s Substantive Due Process Clause 
The Missouri Constitution also provides “[t]hat no person shall be de-
prived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.”36  As with Mis-
souri’s equal protection clause, the Supreme Court of Missouri has held that 
the due process clauses of the Missouri Constitution and the United States 
Constitution are coextensive.37  Concerning legislative action, “due process 
protects fundamental rights and liberties that are ‘deeply rooted in this Na-
tion’s history and traditions,’ and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty.’”38  State action that “deprives one of life, liberty or property [must] be 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest” in order to satisfy substantive 
due process.39  The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized fun-
damental rights or liberty interests for purposes of substantive due process in 
areas such as family autonomy,40 the right to privacy,41 reproductive auton-
  
 32. Fust v. Att’y Gen. of Mo., 947 S.W.2d 424, 432 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (quot-
ing Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331-32 (1981)); see also Kilmer v. Mun, 17 
S.W.3d 545, 552 n.21 (Mo. 2000) (en banc) (“A statute that creates arbitrary classifi-
cations that are irrelevant to the achievement of the statute’s purpose may be struck 
down because the arbitrary classifications violate equal protection.”). 
 33. Missourians for Tax Justice Educ. Project, 959 S.W.2d at 103. 
 34. In re Marriage of Woodson, 92 S.W.3d 780, 784 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (find-
ing that a “[h]usband does not have a fundamental right in [w]ife’s teacher retire-
ment”).  
 35. Id.  Missouri courts do not substitute their judgment in place of the legisla-
ture’s judgment as to “the wisdom, social desirability or economic policy underlying a 
statute.”  Mo. Prosecuting Att’ys & Circuit Att’ys Ret. Sys. v. Pemiscot Cnty., 256 
S.W.3d 98, 102 (Mo. 2008) (en banc) (quoting In re Kohring, 999 S.W.2d at 233).  
 36. MO. CONST. art. I, § 10.  
 37. Doe v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 833, 841 (Mo. 2006) (en banc). 
 38. In re Woodson, 92 S.W.3d at 783 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 
U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997)). 
 39. Roy v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 23 S.W.3d 738, 746 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000) 
(quoting Lane v. State Comm. of Psychologists, 954 S.W.2d 23, 24 (Mo. App. E.D. 
1997)).  
 40. See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 
U.S. 510, 535 (1925).  
 41. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). 
7
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omy,42 and medical care decisions.43  As with fundamental rights and suspect 
classes under the equal protection clause, statutes affecting fundamental 
rights under the substantive due process clause receive strict scrutiny.44  In 
sum, doctrine commands that a substantive rule of law be invalidated “if it 
impinges on liberty interests that ‘are so fundamental that a state may not 
interfere with them . . . unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling state interest.’”45 
C.  Heightened Levels of Scrutiny 
While the Supreme Court of Missouri has held that the equal protection 
and substantive due process clauses of the Missouri Constitution are at least 
coextensive with the United States Constitution,46 Missouri courts appear to 
have left open the question whether the federal Constitution provides a floor 
rather than a ceiling.47  Indeed, a broader reading of the Missouri Constitution 
is not an unprecedented occurrence.48  In fact, one case has suggested that the 
Missouri Constitution’s due process and equal protection clauses should be 
construed more broadly when federal precedents “dilute these important 
rights.”49  Broader protections by the Missouri Constitution could conceiva-
bly allow the application of heightened scrutiny to a right or a class, such as 
homosexuals, generally only given rational basis review under federal law.50 
Missouri courts generally follow the federal standard when determining 
whether a classification is subject to heightened scrutiny.51  Factors consid-
ered under the federal standard generally look to: (1) whether a classified 
group has suffered historical discrimination; (2) whether the class exhibits 
obvious, immutable characteristics that defines them as a discrete group; and 
  
 42. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 452-53 (1972). 
 43. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).  
 44. Doe v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 833, 845 (Mo. 2006) (en banc). 
 45. Id. at 842 (quoting Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 709 (8th Cir. 2005)). 
 46. See supra Part II.A-B. 
 47. See, e.g., Phillips, 194 S.W.3d at 841 (“provisions of our state constitution 
may be construed to provide more expansive protections than comparable federal 
constitutional provisions” (quoting State v. Rushing, 935 S.W.2d 30, 34 (Mo. 1996) 
(en banc))).  
 48. See, e.g., Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 212 (Mo. 2006) (en banc) 
(finding “more expansive and concrete protections of the right to vote under the Mis-
souri Constitution”); State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper 102 S.W.3d 541, 545-46 (Mo. 
2003) (en banc) (noting that the Missouri Constitution provides broader habeas corpus 
rights than the federal Consitution).  
 49. State ex rel. J.D.S. v. Edwards, 574 S.W.2d 405, 409 (Mo. 1978) (en banc).  
 50. See Corrected Memorandum supra note 13, at 39-44.  
 51. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text; see also Harrell v. Total 
Health Care, Inc., 781 S.W.2d 58, 64 n.4 (Mo. 1989) (en banc) (quoting Mass. Bd. of 
Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976)). 
8
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(3) whether the group is able to protect itself through the political process.52  
However, the federal standard used in evaluating discrimination on the basis 
of gender or sexual orientation reveals inconsistent scrutiny applications.53  
Often these classes have been referred to as “quasi-suspect,” or classifications 
that should receive “intermediate” scrutiny.54  Whether or not Missouri spe-
cifically recognizes “quasi-suspect” classifications is an open question.55  
However, Missouri courts have followed federal precedent and recognized 
gender as a classification that should receive intermediate scrutiny.56  That 
means, a classification on the basis of gender “must serve important govern-
mental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those 
objectives.”57  
In line with federal Supreme Court precedent, the Supreme Court of 
Missouri previously found a classification based on sexual preference to be 
neither subject to intermediate scrutiny, nor quasi-suspect.58  In the same 
case, the court held that “there is no fundamental right . . . to engage in pri-
vate consensual homosexual activity.”59  However, this reasoning was based 
on Bowers v. Hardwick,60 in which the Supreme Court of the United States 
held that criminal prohibitions on same-sex sodomy did not violate the fed-
eral Constitution.61  In Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court overruled Bow-
ers.62   
Lawrence involved two men arrested for violating a Texas state law that 
made it illegal to “engage[] in deviate sexual intercourse with another indi-
vidual of the same sex.”63  The Court found that such laws violated a homo-
sexual’s protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
  
 52. See, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987) (quoting Lyng v. 
Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986)).  
 53. Compare City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) 
(“Legislative classifications based on gender also call for a heightened standard of 
review.”), with Rainey v. Chever, 527 U.S. 1044 (1999) (denying review where a 
lower court used intermediate scrutiny in evaluating whether a statute creates a gen-
der-based classification).  
 54. See Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 175 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 55. See Harrell, 781 S.W.2d at 63.  However, the Supreme Court of Missouri 
has, on occasion, used the “quasi-suspect” terminology without reservations.  See 
Berdella v. Pender, 821 S.W.2d 846, 851 (Mo. 1991) (en banc).  
 56. See, e.g., Comm. for Educ. Equal. v. State, 294 S.W.3d 477, 496 n.4 (Mo. 
2009) (en banc). 
 57. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).  
 58. State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508, 511 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).  
 59. Id. at 511. 
 60. Id.; see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Law-
rence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
 61. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 197.  
 62. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“Bowers was not correct when it was decided, 
and it is not correct today.”). 
 63. Id. at 562-63 (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (West 2011)).  
9
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teenth Amendment to choose to engage in sexual acts with members of the 
same sex within the confines of their own homes and in their private lives.64  
The Court noted “an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protec-
tion to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters 
pertaining to sex.”65  With this awareness in mind, the Court found that the 
Texas statute violated the Due Process Clause, as it furthered “no legitimate 
state interest which [could] justify its intrusion into the personal and private 
life of the individual.”66   
Controversially, Lawrence subjected the Texas statute to a broadened 
form of rational basis review, yet remained silent on whether homosexual 
sodomy is a fundamental right.67  Further, the Court did not specifically sub-
ject the statute to strict scrutiny, which would have been appropriate had it 
concluded that homosexual sodomy was a fundamental right.68  Many argue 
that the decision in Lawrence had little, if any, basis in the United States Con-
stitution or Supreme Court precedent.69  Yet with the reasoning and support 
of Lawrence, many courts have concluded that sexual orientation should be 
recognized as a suspect or quasi-suspect classification and that a heightened 
form of scrutiny should be applied.70 
D.  Romer v. Evans71 and the Problem with “Animus” 
Romer v. Evans involved a 1992 Colorado referendum, in which Colo-
rado voters adopted a state constitutional amendment – Amendment 2 – “pro-
hibit[ing] all legislative, executive or judicial action . . . designed to protect . . 
. homosexual persons.”72  Amendment 2 was proposed in response to a num-
ber of municipal ordinances in place that prohibited discrimination on the 
  
 64. Id. at 567, 578.  
 65. Id. at 572.  
 66. Id. at 578.  
 67. Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 68. Id.  
 69. See, e.g., id. at 599.  
 70. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 997 (N.D. Cal. 2010), 
aff’d sub nom. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012) (“All classifications 
based on sexual orientation appear suspect.”); see also Collins v. Brewer, 727 F. 
Supp. 2d 797, 804 (D. Ariz. 2010) (invalidating statute under rational basis review but 
pointing out that some form of heightened scrutiny may apply to plaintiffs’ claims), 
aff’d sub nom. Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2011); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of 
Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 463-69 (Conn. 2008) (analyzing federal precedent when 
interpreting state constitution and concluding that cases ruling that gay persons are 
not a suspect or quasi-suspect class are unpersuasive because of their reliance on 
Bowers).  But see Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d at 1082 (affirming Perry v. Schwarzeneg-
ger under rational basis review and not using a heightened form of scrutiny). 
 71. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).  
 72. Id. at 623-24. 
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basis of sexual orientation in areas such as employment, housing, education, 
public accommodations, and health and welfare services.73  In response to the 
adoption of Amendment 2, a number of homosexuals sued seeking a declara-
tion of the amendment’s invalidity and an injunction preventing its enforce-
ment.74   
The Supreme Court of the United States found that Amendment 2 
“lack[ed] a rational relationship to [any] legitimate state interest[].”75  Noting 
that “[i]t is not within our constitutional tradition to enact laws of this sort[,]” 
the Court further opined that such laws “raise the inevitable inference that the 
disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons af-
fected.”76  The Court concluded that Amendment 2 classified homosexuals 
for the sole reason of “mak[ing] them unequal to everyone else.”77 
The Court effectively held that Amendment 2 was unconstitutional be-
cause no law derived from animus toward a specific class could be rationally 
related to a legitimate end.  Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit used similar logic in overturning California’s voter-enacted 
law, Proposition 8.78  Prior to the adoption of Proposition 8, California law 
recognized a right for same-sex couples to have their committed relationships 
designated as “marriage.”79  Proposition 8 eliminated this right by providing, 
“[o]nly marriage between a man and woman is valid or recognized in Cali-
fornia.”80  In overturning Proposition 8, the Ninth Circuit did not consider the 
broader question of whether or not same-sex couples have a fundamental 
right to marry, but instead based its decision on the narrow issue of whether 
stripping a previously held right from same-sex couples rationally served a 
legitimate state interest.81  The Ninth Circuit focused on Romer, noting that 
what the Supreme Court forbids is “the targeted exclusion of a group of citi-
zens from a right or benefit that they [previously have] enjoyed on equal 
terms with all other citizens.”82  The Ninth Circuit held that taking away the 
designation of “marriage” furthered no legitimate state interest and left the 
“‘inevitable inference’” that Proposition 8 was “‘born of animosity toward’” 
same-sex couples as a class.83  Looking to Romer, the Ninth Circuit said, 
“[e]nacting a rule into law based solely on the disapproval of a group . . . ‘is a 
  
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. at 625.  
 75. Id. at 632. 
 76. Id. at 633-34.  
 77. Id. at 635.  
 78. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1080-81 (9th Cir. 2012).  
 79. Id. at 1063.  
 80. Id. at 1067.  As the Ninth Circuit explained, Proposition 8 “stripped same-
sex couples of the right to have their committed relationships recognized by the State 
with the designation of ‘marriage.’”  Id. at 1076.   
 81. Id. at 1076.  
 82. Id. at 1084. 
 83. Id. at 1093 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996)). 
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classification of persons undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal 
Protection Clause does not permit.’”84 
E.  Case Law Examining Statutes Similar to Missouri Revised Statutes 
Section 104.140(3) 
While challenges to statutes providing benefits for surviving spouses 
only are not especially common, cases do exist in which a surviving domestic 
partner has sought benefits under a statute similar to Missouri Revised Stat-
utes section 104.140(3).  This Part of the Law Summary describes some of 
those cases, first examining a Florida case that found in favor of the state, and 
then by looking at cases that found in favor of the surviving partner. 
On July 6, 2001, a Florida police officer, Lois Marrero, was shot and 
killed while pursuing two bank robbers.85  Shortly after her death, it became 
apparent that her same-sex partner Mickie Mashburn, a detective for the same 
police department, would be ineligible to receive Marrero’s pension pay-
ments.86  The women had been a couple for ten years, but because Florida law 
did not recognize same-sex marriages, Mashburn could not receive the pen-
sion because only surviving spouses or children were eligible.87  Despite not 
qualifying, Mashburn applied for pension benefits as a surviving spouse any-
way, asking the pension board to recognize her as a widow.88  In August 
2001, the pension board denied Mashburn’s request for pension benefits on 
the basis of her not qualifying as Marrero’s spouse89 and following an appeal 
by Mashburn, again denied the pension award in February 2002.90  Following 
the denial, Mashburn vowed to challenge the decision in Florida state court.91  
  
 84. Id. at 1094 (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 635).  
 85. Geoff Dutton & Sean Lengell, Killed in “Cold Blood,” TAMPA TRIBUNE, 
July 7, 2001, at Nation/World 1.  The shooter, Nester Luis DeJesus, took his own life 
following a lengthy standoff with police.  Id.  The other individual involved was his 
girlfriend, who was later charged with first-degree murder.  Id. 
 86. Laura Kinsler, Companion Not Eligible for Slain Officer’s Pension, TAMPA 
TRIBUNE, July 10, 2001, at Nation/World 4.  The pension payments were equal to 
one-half of Marrero’s salary.  Id.  For an interesting account of the events and Mash-
burn’s attempt to receive benefits, see the documentary TYING THE KNOT (2004). 
 87. Kinsler, supra note 86.  Unfortunately for Mashburn, the city of Tampa, only 
three days before Marrero’s slaying, enacted a policy that would have allowed Mar-
rero to name a specific beneficiary of her pension.  Laura Kinsler, Marrero’s Pension 
Studied, TAMPA TRIBUNE, July 19, 2001, at Metro 1.  Given the timing of her death, 
Marrero had not yet identified such a beneficiary.  Id. 
 88. Geoff Dutton, Officer’s Partner Applies for Pension, TAMPA TRIBUNE, Aug. 
18, 2001, at Metro 1. 
 89. See Geoff Dutton, Officer Denied Pension, TAMPA TRIBUNE, Aug. 29, 2001, 
at Metro 1.  
 90. Laura Kinsler, Board Denies Pension for Slain Officer’s Partner, TAMPA 
TRIBUNE, Feb. 27, 2002, at Nation/World 1.  
 91. Id.  
12
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Despite her contentions, Mashburn’s case was eventually denied review by a 
Florida appeals court.92 
While the Mashburn case is the only case directly on point with the de-
veloping situation in Missouri, it fails to provide much by way of an opinion.   
Other cases exist in which public employees with same-sex domestic partners 
have challenged state and municipal programs that grant valuable benefits to 
spouses of employees, but deny such benefits to unmarried employees and 
their domestic partners.  However, not all states follow Florida.   
Alaska has found in favor of same-sex couples on this issue.93  In a case 
that commenced in 1999, nine same-sex couples, along with the help of the 
Alaska Civil Liberties Union, filed suit against the state of Alaska and the 
municipality of Anchorage alleging that employment benefits programs that 
only grant benefits to spouses of state or municipality employees or retirees 
violated their right to equal protection under the Alaska Constitution.94  
Alaska’s Marriage Amendment provides that “a marriage may exist only 
between one man and one woman.”95  This “absolutely precluded [the plain-
tiff employees and their same-sex partners] from becoming eligible for these 
benefits.”96  However, the plaintiffs’ argument did not focus on the Marriage 
Amendment.97  Rather, they argued that “the benefits programs discrimi-
nate[d] against them by denying them benefits that the programs provide to 
others who . . . [were] similarly situated.”98  Alaska and Anchorage argued 
that the benefits programs at issue did not apply differently based on sexual 
orientation or gender, but were based only on marital status.99  The Alaska 
Supreme Court did not agree and ruled that the comparison was between 
same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples.100 
After making this decision, the court noted that the plaintiffs’ interest at 
issue, employment benefits, was purely economic and therefore should re-
ceive “minimum scrutiny.”101  Under Alaska’s Equal Protection Clause the 
government must demonstrate that its objectives were legitimate and that the 
means employed to further these objectives were substantially related to the 
  
 92. Mashburn v. Tampa Fire & Police Pension Bd., 887 So. 2d 342 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2004) (unpublished table decision) (denying certiorari).  
 93. See Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. State, 122 P.3d 781, 783 (Alaska 2005).  
 94. Id. at 784.  
 95. Id. (quoting ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25). 
 96. Id.  
 97. Id. at 787. 
 98. Id.  
 99. Id.  This argument allowed the defendants to contend that they were treating 
same-sex couples the same way they treated other unmarried couples.  Id.  Thus, they 
contended that no unmarried couple had the right to employment benefits.  Id. at 788.   
 100. Id. at 788.  
 101. Id. at 790.  
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end goal.102  Alaska and Anchorage argued that they had legitimate interests 
in (1) cost control, (2) administrative efficiency, and (3) promotion of mar-
riage.103  The court found that each of these interests was in fact, legitimate; 
however, it ruled against the state because the “absolute denial of benefits to 
public employees with same-sex domestic partners is not substantially related 
to these governmental interests.”104 
In another case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
recently affirmed a federal court decision in Arizona that followed a line of 
reasoning similar to that of the Alaska Supreme Court.105  The Arizona case 
involved a group of gay and lesbian state employees suing Arizona state offi-
cials over a statutory amendment that eliminated family health benefits for 
non-spouse domestic partners.106  At the time of the suit, Arizona law permit-
ted both spouses and domestic partners of state employees to receive health 
care benefits.107  The amendment at issue, Section O, was to take effect on 
January 1, 2011, and in an effort to prevent this amendment from becoming 
law, the plaintiffs filed suit under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.108  The court noted that although Section O was not dis-
criminatory on its face, as applied, it “makes benefits available on terms that 
  
 102. Id. at 789.  The court noted that the Alaska Constitution “affords greater 
protection to individual rights than the United States Constitution’s Fourteenth 
Amendment.”  Id. at 787 (quoting Malabed v. N. Slope Borough, 70 P.3d 416, 420 
(Alaska 2003)).  That is, in applying the lowest level of scrutiny in Alaska a substan-
tial connection must exist, while under the Fourteenth Amendment, there must only 
be some rational basis.  Id. at 786 n.20, 791; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; 
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). 
 103. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 122 P.3d at 790.  
 104. Id. at 793-94.  The court went on to say that regardless of the challenged 
program’s policy goals, “the means [the government employs] would not be fairly and 
substantially related to furthering those goals.”  Id. at 794.  
 105. See Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’g Collins v. 
Brewer, 727 F. Supp. 2d 797, 807 (D. Ariz. 2010).  
 106. Collins, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 801.  
 107. Id. at 799 (quoting ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R2-5-416 (repealed 2009)).  Do-
mestic partners seeking such benefits were required to prove the legitimacy of their 
partnership in accordance with Arizona’s definition of “domestic partner.”  Id. at 799-
800.  
 108. Id. at 801.  The federal court’s opinion was issued in response to both the 
State’s motion to dismiss and the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction.  Id. at 
799.  For the purposes of this analysis, the court’s ruling on the defendants’ Motion to 
Dismiss provides the most insight.  All allegations of the Complaint are construed as 
true and in the manner that is most favorable to the nonmoving party, in this case the 
plaintiffs.  Id. at 802.  Regarding plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, the 
analysis of plaintiffs’ equal protection claim that accompanied the court’s ruling on 
defendants’ motion to dismiss also provides relevant insight on why the court ulti-
mately found a likelihood of success and granted plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary 
injunction.  Id. at 811-12.  
14
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are a legal impossibility for gay and lesbian couples.”109  Despite the plain-
tiffs’ contention that such discrimination deserved a heightened form of scru-
tiny, the court analyzed the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim under the ra-
tional basis standard of review.110  Arizona justified the amendment with 
rationales claiming that it: (1) promoted cost savings, (2) promoted adminis-
trative efficiency, (3) allocated funds to those that are better served by receiv-
ing such funds, (4) benefited families with dependent children, and (5) pro-
moted marriage.111  Although the state’s interests in these goals were legiti-
mate, the court stated that “the absolute denial of benefits to employees with 
same-sex domestic partners [was] not rationally and substantially related to 
these government interests.”112 
New Hampshire state courts have also followed this line of reasoning.113  
In a Title VII employment discrimination case, two lesbians sued state orga-
nizations over whether or not their committed same-sex domestic partners 
were entitled to the benefits reserved for employees’ spouses.114  The plain-
tiffs argued that they were discriminated against on the basis of their sexual 
orientation.115  They based their argument on the fact that benefits were avail-
able to the married partners of state employees, but same-sex persons were, at 
the time, unable to be married and therefore unable to receive these bene-
fits.116  The court agreed with this argument and citing Alaska Civil Liberties 
Union, stated: 
[S]ame-sex partners have no ability to ever qualify for the same 
employment benefits unmarried heterosexual couples may avail 
themselves of by deciding to legally commit to each other through 
marriage.  For this reason, unmarried, heterosexual employees are 
not similarly situated to unmarried, gay and lesbian employees for 
the purposes of receiving employee benefits.117 
Thus, the court found that the plaintiffs had stated a claim for sexual ori-
entation discrimination.118 
  
 109. Id. at 803.  
 110. Id. at 804.  
 111. Id. at 804-05.  
 112. Id. at 807.  The court noted again that facts alleged in the complaint are to be 
construed in favor of the non-moving party.  Id.  
 113. See Bedford v. N.H. Cmty. Technical. Coll. Sys., Nos. 04-E-229, 04-E-230, 
2006 WL 1217283 (N.H. Super. May 3, 2006).  New Hampshire now allows same-
sex marriage.  N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1-a (Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.). 
 114. Bedford, 2006 WL 1217283 at *1-2.  
 115. Id. at *2.  
 116. Id.  
 117. Id. at *6-7 (citing Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. State, 122 P.3d 781, 788 
(Alaska 2005)).  
 118. Id. at *7.  
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III.  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: GLOSSIP V. MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION AND HIGHWAY PATROL EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT 
SYSTEM 
As detailed above, Kelly Glossip filed a lawsuit seeking survivor bene-
fits following his partner’s death.119  On April 12, 2012, Judge Daniel Green 
of the Cole County Circuit Court heard oral argument from Glossip and 
MPERS.  On April 30, 2012, the trial court ruled in favor of MPERS, dis-
missing the case pursuant to the motion of MPERS and denying Glossip’s 
summary judgment motion as moot.120  This Part of the Law Summary out-
lines and examines the arguments presented before the trial court.  Specifi-
cally, the first section will explain in more detail the parties’ arguments re-
garding Glossip’s equal protection claim.  The second section looks at Glos-
sip’s due process claims under the Missouri Constitution and the defenses 
presented by MPERS. 
A.  Glossip’s Equal Protection Claim 
Glossip alleged that his equal protection rights were denied on the basis 
of his sexual orientation and on the basis of his sex.121  The crux of Glossip’s 
equal protection argument was that in requiring the recipient of survivor 
benefits to be a “spouse” of the deceased MSHP employee, gays, lesbians, 
and bisexuals – individuals “similarly situated in every material respect to the 
different-sex, surviving partners of deceased MSHP employees who are af-
forded the opportunity to access significant survivor benefits granted exclu-
sively on the basis of marriage” – are categorically excluded from receiving 
the same benefits received by surviving spouses.122  MPERS countered Glos-
sip’s equal protection claims by arguing that the statutes at issue did not vio-
late Glossip’s right to equal protection because all cohabitants, including un-
married heterosexual couples, may not receive survivor benefits on the basis 
of an intimate, but unmarried relationship.  In other words, all unmarried in-
dividuals are precluded from receiving survivor benefits under the statute, 
regardless of sexual orientation.123  Glossip contended that, “[a] same-sex 
  
 119. See supra notes 5-19 and accompanying text. 
 120. Glossip v. Mo. Dep’t of Transp. & Highway Patrol Emps. Ret. Sys., No. 10AC-
CC00812 (Cole Cnty. Cir. Ct. Apr. 30, 2012).  Following the trial court’s judgment in 
favor of MPERS, Glossip appealed to the Supreme Court of Missouri.  The Supreme 
Court of Missouri heard argument on the case on February 27, 2013.  As of this writ-
ing, a decision is pending.   
 121. Amended Petition, supra note 12, ¶¶ 64, 70.  
 122. Id. ¶ 62.  
 123. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Petition, supra note 13, 
at 5.  Interestingly, it appears that in later filings, the Attorney General, on behalf of 
MPERS, may have backed off of the claim that no classification existed, as this ar-
gument is not discussed in later filings.   
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couple that is categorically barred from marrying . . . is not similarly situated 
to a different-sex couple that is legally capable of marrying but declines to do 
so.”124  This argument was in line with the opinions rendered in the previ-
ously discussed Alaska, Arizona, and New Hampshire cases.125 
Glossip argued that discrimination based on sexual orientation and gen-
der demands a heightened level of scrutiny because both classes are “sus-
pect.”126  Glossip contended that at a minimum, sexual orientation should be 
classified as a quasi-suspect class.127  In support of these assertions, Glossip 
pointed to the factors generally considered by the Supreme Court of the 
United States when determining whether a classification should be recog-
nized as suspect or quasi-suspect.128  He also pointed out the significance of 
Lawrence v. Texas,129 and asserted that a “straightforward application of the 
traditional heightened-scrutiny factors requires that sexual orientation be rec-
ognized as a suspect classification.”130 
MPERS rejected the application of strict scrutiny.131  First, MPERS con-
tended that “the statutes [did] not implicate a fundamental right.”132  Specifi-
cally, MPERS noted that the survivor benefits sought by Glossip were merely 
an economic benefit and that such a benefit did not implicate a fundamental 
right.133  Additionally, MPERS argued that the statutes did not disadvantage a 
suspect class.134  According to MPERS, “[s]trict scrutiny [did] not apply here 
  
 124. Corrected Memorandum, supra note 13, at 20.   
 125. See supra Part II.E. 
 126. Amended Petition, supra note 12, ¶ 66,72.  For discussion on the application 
of heightened scrutiny, see supra Part II.C.  
 127. Corrected Memorandum, supra note 13, at 31. 
 128. Id. at 31-32 (“The four factors most consistently analyzed by the Court are: 
(1) whether a classified group has suffered a history of invidious discrimination, (2) 
whether the classification has any bearing on a person’s ability to perform in or con-
tribute to society; (3) whether the characteristic is immutable or beyond the person’s 
control; and (4) whether the group has sufficient power to protect itself in the political 
process.”).  
 129. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.  
 130. Corrected Memorandum, supra note 13, at 33.  Glossip analyzed the “height-
ened-scrutiny” factors and finds that (1) homosexuals “have suffered a history of 
discrimination,” (2) a person’s sexual orientation does not affect his or her “ability to 
contribute to society,” (3) sexual orientation “cannot be changed,” and (4) homosexu-
als “suffer severe disadvantages in the political arena.”  Id. at 34-38.  
 131. Defendant’s Response in Opposition, supra note 13, at 46. 
 132. Id. at 46-47.  
 133. See id. at 47.  Glossip suggests that “denial of his application for survivor 
benefits interfered with” rights such as the “right to bodily integrity,” the “right to 
family integrity,” and the “right to sexual intimacy with a partner.”  Id.  These argu-
ments seem to fit more along substantive due process lines and will be discussed infra 
in Part III.B.  
 134. Defendant’s Response in Opposition, supra note 13, at 48-49.  
17
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because unmarried couples are not considered a suspect class.”135  Moreover, 
MPERS suggested that “where all unmarried cohabitants” are denied access 
to “survivorship benefits on the basis of an intimate relationship,” no equal 
protection violation exists.136  Bearing in mind that the equal protection 
clauses of the Missouri and United States Constitutions are coextensive,137 
MPERS demanded that the court decline Glossip’s “invitation to expand in-
terpretation of the equal protection clause of the Missouri [C]onstitution to 
determine the level of scrutiny applicable to [Glossip’s] claim for monetary 
benefits.”138  In making this argument, MPERS pointed out that the Alaska 
case cited by Glossip was inapposite because Alaska’s equal protection clause 
is more “stringent” than Missouri’s equal protection clause.139 
MPERS next argued that because the only interest at stake was eco-
nomic in nature, Glossip’s equal protection challenge should only receive 
rational basis review.140  Such a statute withstands a constitutional attack “if 
any state of facts can be reasonably conceived that would justify it.”141  Here, 
MPERS argued that there was a rational relationship between the subject 
statutes and Missouri’s interests in (1) “administrative efficiency in making 
objective beneficiary determinations,” (2) “controlling costs,” and (3) “pre-
serving limited retirement system resources for those most likely to be eco-
nomically dependent on a deceased member[.]”142 
Although Glossip focused much of his argument on the need for the case 
to be decided under heightened scrutiny, he contended that if such scrutiny 
did not apply, the “exclusion of same-sex couples from survivor benefits 
would still fail . . . rational basis review.”143  Initially, Glossip directed the 
court’s attention to cases that have found statutory schemes similar to Mis-
souri Revised Statutes section 104.140(3) unconstitutional for their failure to 
be “rationally related to any legitimate government interest.”144  He placed 
special emphasis on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Diaz, which was analyzed 
  
 135. Id. at 48 (citing Smith v. Shalala, 5 F.3d 235, 239 (7th Cir. 1993)). 
 136. Id.  
 137. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.  
 138. Defendant’s Response in Opposition, supra note 13, at 48 (emphasis added).  
The emphasis added here is to highlight the importance of MPERS’s focus on mone-
tary benefits.  The implications of this will be discussed infra in Part IV.A.  
 139. Defendant’s Response in Opposition, supra note 13, at 48-49. 
 140. Reply in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 13, at 2-3.  
 141. Alderson v. State, 273 S.W.3d 533, 537 (Mo. 2009) (en banc). 
 142. Reply in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 13, at 4.  
 143. Plaintiff’s Reply in Support, supra note 13, at 5.  
 144. Id. at 6 (citing Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2011); Collins v. 
Brewer, 727 F. Supp. 2d 797 (D. Ariz. 2010); Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. State, 
122 P.3d 781 (Alaska 2005)).  
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under the federal Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause.145  Glossip also 
focused on more specific justifications for why the Missouri statute failed 
rational basis review.  First, he drew the court’s attention to the history of 
Missouri’s law banning gay marriage and the related statutes excluding same-
sex couples from receiving benefits, such as those at issue in this case.146  
According to Glossip, Missouri’s enactment of such laws was in response to 
the possibility that Hawaii was on the verge of recognizing same-sex mar-
riage, and thus, the Missouri legislature “amended the existing statutory 
scheme with the specific purpose of barring same-sex couples from receiving 
the same benefits given to married heterosexual couples[.]”147  Glossip con-
cluded that “[n]o legislature in 1996 or after could have conceivably thought 
that categorically excluding same-sex couples from survivor benefits ration-
ally serves any of the interests identified by [MPERS].”148   
Regarding MPERS’s proposed rational basis that “married couples are 
more likely to be financially interdependent than unmarried couples,”149 
Glossip argued: 
[T]hat distinction makes sense only if a couple has the ability to 
legally marry but declines to do so.  Since the Missouri Constitu-
tion bars same-sex couples from marrying no matter how commit-
ted and financially interdependent they are, it is not rational to use 
the fact that same-sex couples are unmarried as a basis for assum-
ing they are not financially interdependent.150 
Furthermore, he contended that even if same-sex couples were less fi-
nancially interdependent than opposite-sex couples, it was not rational to 
categorically exclude them all from benefits.151 
Glossip also rebutted MPERS’s contention that “limiting survivor bene-
fits to married couples was a rational means” of promoting administrative 
efficiency and making objective beneficiary determinations.152  In support of 
this argument, Glossip cited evidence that, at least in his mind, demonstrated 
that MPERS’s “speculations” about establishing objective eligibility criteria 
have “no footing in the realities of how domestic partnership benefits are 
  
 145. Id. at 6-7.  Glossip found this case “instructive because the Attorney General 
concede[d] that if discrimination cannot survive rational basis review under the fed-
eral Constitution, then it violates the Missouri Constitution as well.”  Id. at 6. 
 146. Id. at 7.  
 147. Id. at 7-8. 
 148. Id. at 8.  
 149. Id. 
 150. Id.  
 151. Id.  
 152. Id. at 10.  
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routinely administered” in other employment contexts.153  Finally, in response 
to MPERS’s asserted rational basis of “controlling costs,” Glossip contended 
that while cost control is a legitimate government interest, it could not be 
achieved “by making irrational and arbitrary distinctions among similarly 
situated people.”154 
B.  Glossip’s Substantive Due Process Claim 
Glossip also contended that the statute at issue burdened his “fundamen-
tal rights . . . to intimate association and family integrity” under the Missouri 
Constitution’s substantive due process clause.155  In support of his substantive 
due process claim, Glossip cited Lawrence and the establishment of a “liberty 
interest to engage in private, intimate sexual conduct with a same-sex part-
ner.”156  In response, MPERS first noted that Missouri “does not prescribe a 
fundamental right to marry a person of the same sex.”157  MPERS then argued 
that none of Glossip’s asserted fundamental rights – such as a “right to bodily 
integrity,” a “right to family integrity,” and a “right to sexual intimacy” – 
were implicated by a claim for “purely monetary benefits.”158  This was the 
emphasis of MPERS’s briefing regarding Glossip’s substantive due process 
claim throughout the trial court proceedings.  As MPERS explained, “the 
posthumous denial of an application for benefits cannot be said to have inter-
fered with [Glossip’s] past association or relationship with [Engelhard].”159 
Glossip’s arguments from here generally followed the same lines as the 
arguments presented by his equal protection challenge.  That is, he argued 
that heightened scrutiny should apply and that even if it did not, the statute at 
issue failed rational basis review.160  However, Glossip, making an argument 
more specifically related to his due process claim, argued that MPERS’s con-
tention that all Glossip had alleged was that he had “a fundamental right to 
collect survivorship benefits” misconstrued his substantive due process 
claim.161  On this point, Glossip specifically argued that he did not have to 
  
 153. Id.  MPERS had previously argued that by establishing this rational means of 
establishing objective eligibility criteria, there was less risk of competing claims and 
the possibility of post-hoc assessments of a same-sex relationship after the death of 
one of the partners.  Id.  Glossip pointed out that in private employment contexts that 
allow benefits for same-sex partners, “employees and their partners may be required 
to sign [an affidavit affirming their relationship] based on objective . . . criteria.”  Id. 
 154. Corrected Memorandum, supra note 13, at 55.  
 155. Id. at 40; Amended Petition, supra note 12, ¶¶ 76-77.  
 156. Corrected Memorandum, supra note 13, at 40 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558, 575 (2003)). 
 157. Defendant’s Response in Opposition, supra note 13, at 47. 
 158. Id.  
 159. Id. at 49.  
 160. See supra Part III.A.  
 161. Corrected Memorandum, supra note 13, at 40.  
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show that he had a fundamental right to collect survivorship benefits, but 
instead must only “show that the denial of [such] benefit[s] burden[ed] or 
penalize[d] other constitutional rights.”162  Therefore, from Glossip’s perspec-
tive, “the question [was] not whether excluding . . . Glossip and . . . Engel-
hard from survivor benefits directly prevented them from exercising their 
fundamental rights, but instead whether [they were] forced ‘to choose be-
tween’ exercising their fundamental rights and receiving a governmental 
benefit.”163  Glossip stated that “when the government places an economic 
burden on the exercise of a fundamental right, that burden must be judged 
under heightened scrutiny.”164  Thus, he asserted that there was no support for 
MPERS’s argument that “‘economic burdens’ on fundamental rights [fail to] 
trigger strict scrutiny.”165   
IV.  DISCUSSION  
This Law Summary has looked at Glossip’s claims under the Missouri 
Constitution’s equal protection and substantive due process clauses, thus this 
Part will focus on the merits of these claims.  Additionally, this Part will also 
look at peripheral issues surrounding Glossip’s ongoing suit.  While the Cole 
County Circuit Court found in favor of MPERS, only time will tell how this 
case will ultimately be decided.  Glossip appealed the trial court’s dismissal 
of his case to the Supreme Court of Missouri, which heard argument on the 
case on February 27, 2013.  While Missouri’s high court is mulling a deci-
sion, the following analysis suggests that the Supreme Court of Missouri is 
probably more likely to rule in favor of MPERS than Glossip.  This would be 
the correct decision.  As will be explained, Glossip has not presented a due 
process claim that affords him the benefit of strict scrutiny.  His claim for 
monetary benefits will receive rational basis review and fail.  Likewise, Glos-
sip’s equal protection claim will fail.  In brief, and as will be elaborated on 
below, Glossip’s equal protection claim should also be scrutinized under the 
rational basis standard because (1) the classification at issue includes all un-
  
 162. Id. at 41.  Glossip cited multiple cases in support of this contention.  Id. at 
41-42 (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (“[The government] 
may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally pro-
tected interests”); Planned Parenthood of Mid-Mo. & E. Kan., Inc. v. Dempsey, 167 
F.3d 458, 461 (8th Cir. 1999) (“Neither Congress nor the states may condition the 
granting of government funds on the forfeiture of constitutional rights.”); Ark. Dep’t 
of Human Servs. v. Cole, No. 10–840, 2011 WL 1319217, at *10 (Ark. Apr. 7, 2011) 
(finding an unconstitutional exclusion existed when “the exercise of one’s fundamen-
tal right to engage in private, consensual sexual activity is conditioned on foregoing 
the privilege of adopting or fostering children.”)).  
 163. Corrected Memorandum, supra note 13, at 43. 
 164. Plaintiff’s Reply in Support, supra note 13, at 5; see Speiser v. Randall, 357 
U.S. 513 (1958); Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201 (Mo. 2006) (en banc).  
 165. Plaintiff’s Reply in Support, supra note 13, at 4.  
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married couples, regardless of sexual orientation, and (2) in the event that the 
classification is found to burden homosexuals, it seems unlikely that the Su-
preme Court of Missouri will find that discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation operates to disadvantage a suspect or quasi-suspect class.  Glos-
sip’s argument that the statute is irrational will not be enough to overcome 
MPERS’s reasonably conceived justifications.166 
A.  Due Process Claim 
MPERS will likely overcome Glossip’s substantive due process claim 
more easily than his equal protection claim.167  Before the trial court, Glossip 
contended that Missouri Revised Statutes section 104.140 burdened his fun-
damental rights to intimate association and family integrity.168  However, 
Missouri courts are not likely to find that a claim for “purely monetary bene-
fits” burdens a fundamental right.169  In an effort to combat this argument, 
Glossip contended that when an economic burden affects the exercise of a 
fundamental right, the burden must be analyzed under heightened scrutiny.170  
Glossip is correct in this regard.171  However, even assuming that during Eng-
elhard’s life, the same-sex couple was entitled to the fundamental rights of 
intimate association and family integrity, Glossip did not necessarily maintain 
these rights after Engelhard’s death.  Simply put, Glossip cannot assert a right 
to intimate association or family integrity with a deceased person.172  Thus, it 
seems likely that his substantive due process claim will fail. 
B. Equal Protection Claim 
Glossip’s equal protection claim will play the greatest role in the case’s 
outcome.  Under Missouri law, determining whether a statute violates the 
  
 166. The trial court concluded that MPERS’s justifications were rational.  Glossip 
v. Mo. Dep’t of Transp. & Highway Patrol Emps. Ret. Sys., No. 10AC-CC00812, at 3-6 
(Cole Cnty. Cir. Ct. Apr. 30, 2012).  
 167. In fact, it appears that on appeal to the Supreme Court of Missouri Glossip 
has effectively abandoned his due process claim, and primarily relies on his equal 
protection claim.  See Brief of Appellant, Glossip v. Mo. Dep’t of Transp. & Highway 
Patrol Emps. Ret. Sys., No. SC 92583 (Mo. argued Feb. 27, 2013). 
 168. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.  
 169. See supra notes 160-65 and accompanying text.  
 170. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.  
 171. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958); Weinschenk v. State, 203 
S.W.3d 201, 214 (Mo. 2006) (en banc).  
 172. MPERS has suggested as much: “Such alleged fundamental rights . . . simply 
are not implicated by [Glossip’s] claim for purely monetary benefits.  [Glossip’s] 
alleged right to receive survivor benefits involves only an economic interest, not 
[Glossip’s] interest in intimacy or association with his deceased partner.”  Defen-
dant’s Response in Opposition, supra note 13, at 47 (emphasis added).  
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equal protection clause requires a two-step analysis.173  First, the court must 
ask whether the classification operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class 
or burdens a fundamental right.174  Then, the court must apply the appropriate 
level of scrutiny.175  Implicit in the first step of this process is identifying the 
classification, or who exactly it is that is being treated differently.  In the in-
stant case, this determination will lay the groundwork for the remainder of the 
court’s analysis.   
Glossip contended that in requiring the recipient of survivor benefits to 
be a “spouse,” the group being classified differently consisted of gay, lesbian, 
and bisexual individuals.176  MPERS argued that the classification applied to 
all unmarried individuals, regardless of sexual orientation.177  The importance 
of this classification inquiry is obvious.  If Glossip can show that gays, lesbi-
ans, and bisexuals are being treated differently because of their sexual orien-
tation, he has the opportunity to present a Lawrence-type argument in order to 
receive heightened scrutiny.  On the other hand, if those being treated differ-
ently are all unmarried couples, regardless of sexual orientation, Glossip’s 
claim is immediately relegated to receiving rational basis review, and in all 
likelihood will fail.  The latter is the appropriate classification.  Regardless of 
whether an individual is a heterosexual or a homosexual, the statute applies in 
the same manner to any individual who is unmarried.  Unmarried couples are 
not a suspect class, and thus, such a classification should receive rational 
basis review.178 
However, even if the court agrees that the classification has burdened 
gays, lesbians, and bisexuals, Glossip must still convince the court that dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation operates to disadvantage a suspect or 
quasi-suspect class.  This is an uphill battle.  Although courts have recently 
been more amenable to a finding that sexual orientation should receive some 
form of heightened scrutiny, many states, including Missouri, have yet to give 
sexual orientation such construction.179  A broader interpretation of the equal 
protection clause of the Missouri Constitution could ultimately open the door 
for a challenge to Missouri’s Marriage Amendment, and it seems reasonable 
to conclude that Missouri courts will be hesitant to take this step.  
This would mean that Glossip’s lawsuit rests on a finding that the statute 
at issue fails rational basis review.180  Indeed, Glossip has argued as much.181  
Glossip’s problem with resting his hopes on a finding of irrationality is that if 
MPERS provides “any state of facts” than can be “reasonably conceived that 
  
 173. See supra Part II.A. 
 174. See supra Part II.A. 
 175. See supra Part II.A. 
 176. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.  
 177. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.  
 178. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. 
 179. See supra notes 155-59 and accompanying text. 
 180. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text. 
 181. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.  
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would justify” the statute, it will withstand his constitutional attack.182  Thus, 
despite his arguments to the contrary, MPERS’s justifications of cost control, 
preserving retirement resources for those who need them most, and adminis-
trative efficiency in making objective benefit determinations all seem to be 
“reasonably conceived.”   
Moreover, because statutory justifications can be “reasonably con-
ceived” at any time,183 Missouri courts are also unlikely to be convinced by 
Glossip’s arguments that Missouri’s law prohibiting same-sex marriage and 
the statutes that followed, including Missouri Revised Statutes section 
104.140, were enacted “with the specific purpose of barring same-sex couples 
from receiving the same benefits given to married heterosexual couples.”184  
Glossip used this argument to rebut all of the rational bases provided by 
MPERS.185  He perhaps could have further used this line of reasoning to 
strengthen his case.  The undertone of this argument – that the statutes were 
enacted on the sole basis of animosity toward homosexuals – seems to pro-
vide more support for Glossip’s hope of a finding of irrationality, than is ac-
tually articulated in his briefing before the trial court.   
While not fully fleshing out this argument, or directly tying it to the as-
sertion that Missouri enacted statutes to specifically bar homosexuals from 
receiving certain benefits, Glossip does echo the sentiments of Romer by 
arguing that Missouri’s “statutory scheme appears designed simply to impose 
disparate treatment for its own sake.”186  If it were shown that animosity to-
ward homosexuals and the possibility of same-sex marriage were the reasons 
for Missouri’s enactment of the statutes at issue, then perhaps an argument 
based on Romer and Perry could support a finding of arbitrariness and irra-
tionality.  After all, Romer suggested that no law derived from animus toward 
a specific class could be rationally related to a legitimate interest.187  How-
ever, the instant case can be distinguished from Romer and Perry in that the 
laws at issue in each of those cases took an already recognized right away 
from the plaintiffs.188  In Missouri, no right to the survivor benefits of a same-
sex partner has ever existed.  Thus, while Romer provides support for Glos-
sip’s claim, it does not mean the Missouri statute is unconstitutional. 
  
 182. Alderson v. State, 273 S.W.3d 533, 537 (Mo. 2009) (en banc).   
 183. See id. 
 184. Plaintiff’s Reply in Support, supra note 13, at 7-8.  
 185. See supra Part III.A. 
 186. Compare Plaintiff’s Reply in Support, supra note 13, at 12, with Romer v. 
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633-35 (1996) (noting that laws that disadvantage homosexuals 
“raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity 
toward the class of persons affected.”). 
 187. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632-33; see also supra Part II.D. 
 188. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 634; Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1093 (9th Cir. 
2012). 
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V.  CONCLUSION  
If an argument based on Romer is a failing argument, and assuming the 
Supreme Court of Missouri finds the statute rational based on MPERS’s rea-
sonably conceived justifications, Glossip will be left with an argument that 
the classification at issue includes gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals, and 
that Missouri should, for the very first time, recognize this group as a suspect, 
or quasi-suspect class.  This argument should fail.  Not only does such an 
argument overlook the appropriate classification at which the analysis should 
start, but it also puts forth a position that is not grounded in Missouri law.  
Missouri has never recognized homosexuals as a suspect or quasi-suspect 
class.  Moreover, Lawrence, the case largely referenced by other courts in 
support of a heightened form of rational basis review for classifications based 
on sexual orientation, was not actually an equal protection case and finds 
little  support in the United States Constitution or Supreme Court precedent.  
If the Supreme Court of Missouri finds that the statute at issue burdens a sus-
pect or quasi-suspect class, it would be doing more than ruling in favor of 
Glossip and his purported desire for survivor benefits.  Such recognition 
would have “far-reaching implications beyond this case”189 by effectively 
opening the door to the very thing that Glossip has, time and again, claimed 
this litigation is not about – a challenge to Missouri’s Marriage Amendment.  
This is the Missouri case to keep an eye on, as both the in-state and potential 
national ramifications are great.   
 
  
 189. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
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